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Foreign direct investment is expected to play a significant role as a multiplier of modern 
production- and management-know-how in Central East European transition economies. 
The so-called technology-spillovers are explained through externalities or extra-market-
linkages. In practice they can take place via demonstration effects, labor mobility, 
supplier contacts, customer contacts or networking activities. However, the empirical 
study on the example of Hungarian industry shows that foreign owned and domestic 
firms – mainly due to their strong technological disparities – build virtually separate 
spheres within the industrial sector. Thus, technology-spillovers do hardly appear as an 




Ausländischen Direktinvestitionen wird in den mittelosteuropäischen Ländern eine 
wesentliche Rolle als Multiplikator modernen Produktions- und Management-Know-
hows zugeschrieben. Die sogenannten Technologie-Spillovers werden in der Theorie 
auf Externalitäten bzw. Extra-market-linkages erklärt. In der Praxis kommen sie über 
Demonstrationseffekte, Arbeitskräftemobilität, Zuliefererkontakte, Kundenkontakte 
oder Netzwerkaktivitäten zustande. Die empirische Untersuchung am Beispiel der 
ungarischen Industrie zeigt jedoch, dass ausländische und einheimische Unternehmen 
vor allem aufgrund der hohen technologischen Entwicklungsunterschiede weitgehend 
getrennte Sphären innerhalb des Industriesektors bilden. Daher kommen Technologie-
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Since the beginning of transition, Central East European countries (CEEC)1 underwent 
substantial restructuring with the result that today the structure of economy in these 
countries is not very different from EU average (see appendix 1 and 2). However, with 
respect to productivity it becomes visible that the CEEC-5 still lack far behind Western 
Europe (see table 1 below). Therefore, the technological renewal process or rather the 
innovation activities of domestic firms need to go much further if these economies want 
to catch up with EU. 
 
 
Table 1: Labor productivity (gross value added per employee) of the CEEC-5 in 
manufacturing industry 1998 
 Labor  productivity 




Czech Republic  53 
Hungary 49 
Data source: Eurostat (see: Stapel, 2001, 6) 
 
 
The technological renewal process requires an international technology transfer which 
for most part takes place via foreign trade but can also be supported through foreign 
direct investment (FDI) (Klodt, 1990). For the host country FDI not only means the 
establishment of modern equipped foreign investment enterprises (FIE) but also a 
                                                 
1 According to the geo-political definition suggested by Sundhausen (1998, 5), the region of Central 
Eastern Europe comprises Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary and the three Baltic 
states Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania. For reasons of data availability, the introduction of this paper focuses 
on Czech Republic (CZ), Estonia (EE), Hungary (HU), Poland (PL) and Slovenia (SL) – the originally 




“spread of knowledge from superior foreign to domestic companies” (Hunya, 2000, 4). 
In this context, spillover-, trickle-down-, learning-, synergy- or multiplier-effects are just 
different expressions of the same phenomenon: innovation activities within 
technologically backward domestic companies deriving from the presence of FIE. 
Technology-spillovers are frequently mentioned in the literature and several authors 
state that the transfer of technology and know-how accompanying FDI is already more 
important for transition economies than the sole capital transfer (Hunya, 1998; 
McMillan, 1996, 139). However, there is no comprehensive theory of technology-
spillovers itself and not much empirical research has been carried out that would allow a 
deeper insight in the practical mechanisms of technology-spillovers and their relevance 
to Central East European transition economies. Therefore, it is the intention of this 
paper to first create a theoretical framework that explains how technology is being 
transferred between FIE and domestic firms in the sense of spillovers and, second, to 
describe the practical significance of technology-spillovers on the example of Hungarian 
industry. 
 
2  Foreign investment enterprises as a source of technology-spillovers – 
definitions and theoretical framework 
2.1  Foreign direct investment 
Different from portfolio-investment, FDI is a long-term oriented investment abroad with 
the main objective of the investor to gain a significant impact on the company’s decision 
making processes (Krugman/Obstfeld, 2000, 169f). According to the International 
Monetary Fund, a significant impact is possible when the foreign investor holds a share 
of at least 10% of the nominal capital (IMF, 1993, 86f). Lower shares count as portfolio 
investment with the main objective of the investor to realize short term gains in the 
stock exchange. These IMF-definitions have mainly been developed for statistical 




OECD countries and non-OECD transition economies have adopted the recommended 
IMF definitions within their national accounts. 
In practice, FDI appears in the form of foreign subsidiaries. A foreign subsidiary is 
defined as a company of which more than 50% of the voting shares are owned by 
another corporation, termed t he parent company (OECD, 1999, 72). Foreign 
subsidiaries are very often 100% foreign owned. They become real through the takeover 
of an existing company abroad (acquisition) or the foundation of a new company 
(greenfield-investment). Companies that establish operating units via FDI in at least two 
countries are called multinational companies. The term multinational company refers to 
the whole concern (Dunning, 1993, 3f). 
 
2.2  Theory of multinational companies 
There is no lack of theories explaining the existence of FDI or rather the existence of 
multinational companies. A whole spectrum of theoretical explanations has been 
developed since the 1960s when FDI became more and more important in practice 
(Caves, 1996; Dunning, 1993, 68ff). The different theoretical explanations that 
developed over time have been integrated by Dunning (1993, 75ff) in his so called OLI-
paradigm. It has become the standard theoretical framework for studies on foreign 
subsidiaries.2 The OLI-paradigm explains FDI by showing under what circumstances a 
parent company will establish a foreign subsidiary instead of entering the foreign market 
via export or licensing to a local producer. Three conditions (O, L, I) must be fulfilled 
before FDI takes place. First, the potential foreign investor – compared to the firms in 
the foreign market – must have ownership-advantages (e.g. firm specific production 
technology, marketing strategies). In order to regard production within the foreign 
market more efficient than export, a second condition must be given. That is, the aspired 
foreign country must offer locational-advantages (e.g. lower taxes, lower wages, cheap 
raw material). However, as it could still be more efficient to have a local company 
                                                 




within the foreign market produce via license-agreement, a third condition must be 
given before a subsidiary will be established abroad. That is, the potential foreign 
investor must face internalization-advantages. This means that it must be more 
efficient for the foreign investor to make use of the firm specific technology within the 
multinational concern through a subsidiary because asymmetric information makes 
license-agreements impossible (failure of technology markets). Only if all three 
conditions, i.e. ownership-, locational-, and internalization-advantages, are given a firm 
will establish a foreign subsidiary instead of engaging in export or license-agreements. 
Dunning’s theoretical framework, as presented here, does not explain technology-
spillovers. But it is reasonable to assume that the technology “packed” in a foreign 
subsidiary cannot be completely protected from trickling down to domestic firms 
(Blomström/Kokko, 1996; Burger, 1998, 48ff). Therefore, the OLI-paradigm lays the 
very foundation for a theoretical explanation of technology-spillovers. However, it must 
be further developed in order to understand why technology-spillovers exist and how 
they take place in practice. 
 
2.3  Explaining technology-spillovers  
In this paper technology-spillovers are defined as the transfer of hard technology 
(tangible assets) or soft technology (knowledge) from FIE to domestic companies 
outside market transactions. The non-market character of technology-spillovers is 
usually explained through positive externalities, which exist because technology at least 
partially is a public good (Grossman/Helpman, 1997, 15f). These so-called externality-
spillovers appear anonymously and without any price to be paid by the technology-
taking company. However, besides externality-spillovers, foreign investors can also 
consciously and intentionally transfer hard or soft technology to domestic companies 
without asking a price to be paid in direct return but expecting future advantages for 
themselves. These extra-market-linkages can e.g. derive from the foreign firm’s interest 
to enable a domestic company to produce certain products and become a future supplier. 




sides, will be called linkage-spillovers. Externality- and linkage-spillovers build two 
main (theoretical) types of spillovers. However, some further considerations are 
necessary in order to explain how technology is finally being transferred from one 
company to another (here from FIE to domestic firms). The following table gives on 
overview of the practical spillover-mechanisms by type. 
 
Table 2: Types and mechanisms of technology-spillovers 
Externality-spillovers Linkage-spillovers 
Demonstration Supplier  contacts 




The  demonstration of technology by foreign investment companies can lead to 
“learning-by-watching” (Burger, 1998, 56) or “reverse engineering” (Mohnen, 1996, 
41). “Learning-by-watching” means that domestic firms observe foreign investor’s 
entrepreneurial actions, e.g. in the field of marketing or logistics, and legally copy 
certain practices which are new to them and result in innovation activities. “Reverse 
engineering” takes place when the domestic firm legally copies product technology after 
the inspection of a foreign company’s product. Technology-spillovers that derive from 
demonstration are a typical example of externality-spillovers.3 
Labor mobility is another mechanism from which externality-spillovers can result. 
Foreign investment companies often invest in professional education and training of 
their local staff (Dunning, 1993, 372ff). So, employees acquire general and specific 
                                                 
3 It can be argued that reverse engineering and learning-by-watching can also take place without the 
presence of FIE, i.e. technology-spillovers appearing across national boundaries. However, transaction 
costs are much lower for domestic companies when FIE operate “next door”. Therefore, FIE do in deed 




qualifications through training programs or just by learning-on-the-job. If the qualified 
employees turn over to domestic companies or open their own business they 
automatically transfer technological knowledge that can be of use for the existing or 
newly founded domestic enterprise. 
Supplier-contacts are another and very often mentioned mechanism for technology-
spillovers (Dunning, 1993, 446ff). The underlying consideration is that foreign firms 
transfer hard or soft technology to domestic firms in order to circumvent transaction 
costs related to the otherwise costly search for adequate suppliers. If domestic suppliers 
receive such support through foreign investors and do not have to pay for it, a typical 
linkage-spillover appears. 
On the other hand, linkage-spillovers can become real through customer-contacts 
between foreign investors as supplier and domestic firms as customers. The idea is that 
the foreign investor transfers technology to the domestic customer above the contractual 
obligation in order to gain a new or bind an existing customer, i.e. for marketing-
strategic reasons. Compared to supplier-contacts, this spillover-mechanism plays a less 
important role in the empirical literature but Blomström (1991) and Blomström/Kokko 
(1996) provide evidence for the growing importance of that mechanism, e.g. with 
respect to computer-based production goods. 
The fifth spillover-mechanism, the so called networking, covers all remaining forms of 
formal cooperation between independent foreign and domestic companies outside 
business contact. Such cooperation, aimed to realize common interests, can take place 
within business organizations, joint research and development projects etc. Linkage-
spillovers within such networking-activities appear when a FIE regards it as useful to 
transfer technology to the domestic cooperation partner who in turn has not to pay for it. 
The distinction between these five observable mechanisms of technology-spillovers is 
an analytical approach and in practice they can often overlap. So it is highly probable 
that e.g. supplier- or customer-contacts are accompanied by “learning-by-watching”. 




mechanisms. Before turning to empirical results the research concept will be briefly 
outlined in the following chapter. 
 
3 Research  concept 
The intention of the empirical study was not to directly measure possible effects of 
technology-spillovers on the side of domestic industry (e.g. productivity growth) but to 
elaborate the real significance of spillover-mechanisms on the basis of an explorative 
empirical study. As the selection of such qualitative research subject requires a 
qualitative research approach, expert interviews have been chosen as the main method 
of investigation. Semi-structured interviews in the sense of Lamnek (1995, 36ff) have 
been carried out in Hungary in the second half of the year 2000 with experts from the 
following five expert groups: 
•  Foreign investment enterprises 
•  Domestic enterprises 
•  Policy-makers 
•  Business associations 
•  Science 
At least five interviews have been carried out in each expert group with leading 
representatives from various companies and organizations (see appendix 3).4 The 
evaluation of the interview material (verbal data) took place according to the “reductive 
procedures” described by Lamnek (1995, 107ff) and Meuser/Nagel (1991). Summarized 
results of expert interviews are presented in chapter 4 of this paper. They are put in italic 
and quote marks. For reasons of data protection, only the relevant expert group is being 
indicated. 
                                                 




In addition to expert interviews, secondary analysis of data from company surveys has 
been done. The search for secondary data took place in Hungary in the year 2000 and 
despite the high specialization of the research subject some research institutes were able 
to offer relevant secondary data that has been included in the empirical study. Details 
will be given in chapter 4 below.5 
 
4  Technology-spillovers within Hungarian industry – empirical results 
Hungary, at first glance, offers favorable preconditions for technology-spillovers to take 
place - regarding the quantity and quality of foreign direct investment and the overall 
absorptive capacity of the economy. Simplified, the absorptive capacity can be regarded 
as a function of the economy’s human capital and research and development (R&D) 
(Cohen/Levinthal, 1990). Like in most other transition economies, the Hungarian 
educational system has a high standard. Accordingly, the economy is well equipped with 
a qualified work force (EBRD, 2000). Despite severe cut backs of the state budget for 
R&D, the Hungarian R&D potential is still characterized as advanced and comparable to 
EU average (OMFB, 1999; Inzelt, 1998). With respect to the qualitative composition of 
FDI in Hungary it can be stated, that it is no longer dominated by low-tech labor 
intensive activities but takes place mainly in high-technology-branches and since the 
mid 1990s also in R&D (Csáki, 1998; Farkas, 2000). 
However, empirical research carried out through expert interviews and secondary 
analysis of survey material does not point to the fact that FIE serve as a source of 
technology-spillovers. Each of the above described mechanisms of technology-
spillovers exist but rather occasionally than generally. The effects are by far not broad 
enough to induce significant innovation activities within domestic firms. The reasons 
for that are the following: 
                                                 
5 I thank all colleagues at the Hungarian research institutes for discussion, friendly support and access to 




Technology-Spillovers via demonstration proved to be difficult to investigate 
empirically. As expected, most respondents stated that “learning-by-watching” often 
takes place without being noticed, neither through the learning company nor through the 
foreign firm demonstrating technology. If at all, demonstration-effects have been of 
importance in the early stage of transition “when more and more foreign investors came 
and domestic firms copied one or another directly visible practice, especially in 
marketing and logistics.  However, many observable techniques require investments 
which domestic companies are hardly able to finance“ (expert group: domestic 
companies). With respect to “reverse engineering”, no evidence could be found that it 
has been relevant at any time during transition. “In the service sector companies 
adopted many new services which were unknown before and possibly copied from 
foreign companies but not necessarily from those within Hungary. In industry the 
copying of products is insignificant and often impossible from a legal perspective” 
(expert group: domestic companies). A sophisticated intellectual property right scheme 
that meets the standards of the European Union’s patent office does limit the scope for 
copying new products in Hungarian industry (Hungarian Patent Office, 1999; Smid, 
1998). 
With respect to labor mobility, it becomes visible – from expert interviews and survey 
material (DUIHK, 1995 and 2000) – that the majority of FIE in Hungarian industry 
invests in professional education of their local work force. Even though, it can be 
concluded that it is strongly unattractive for employees to switch from FIE to domestic 
employers because they usually cannot pay an income or additional benefits as high as 
foreign investors. “Sometimes labor turnover from a foreign subsidiary to domestic 
companies takes place but rather occasionally than generally. It is too expensive for 
Hungarian owned firms to attract employees from multinational companies, especially 
those with an academic degree and leading position” (expert group: economic policy). 
The possibilities for qualified persons to open a small or medium sized company in 
Hungary are not very attractive neither due to credit market failure. “Private banks 
hardly offer finance schemes for small and medium sized companies and there is only 




their own financial resources if they intend to open up or enlarge a business in 
Hungary” (expert group: science). 
Considering supplier-contacts, an investigation carried out by the Hungarian Ministry 
of Economic Affairs among selected big FIE (>500 employees) shows that their 
domestic purchases vary extremely, i.e. from below 5% to more than 70% depending on 
the companies’ purchasing policy. The Hungarian Ministry of Economic Affairs 
estimates that foreign companies on average buy 10-20% of their supplier products from 
domestic firms (Hungarian Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2000, 39). A more 
comprehensive survey carried out by the Economic Research Institute of the Hungarian 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (MKIK-GVI) in the year 2000 among all 100% 
foreign owned firms in Central Hungary points to the same direction.6 Foreign 
investment firms buy on average 43% of their industrial supplier products within 
Hungary, but one third of this in turn comes from other foreign investment firms settled 
within Hungary (MKIK, 2000). Especially the big foreign investment companies usually 
bring with them their suppliers from abroad that establish subsidiaries close to their 
customers in Hungary. That contributes to the domestic value added but does not help 
existing Hungarian suppliers to technologically modernize. Supplier-contacts are a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for technology- or rather linkage-spillovers to take 
place in the above described way. However, it is reasonable to assume that the scope for 
spillovers via supplier-contact is higher the more domestic suppliers are involved. But 
so far the proportion of domestic suppliers is low. According to expert interviews, 
supplier support through FIE is offered very rarely and only to the already advanced and 
competitive domestic suppliers. “Supplier support is not the main task of foreign 
investors in Hungary. It can be efficient but the domestic supplier must fulfill minimum 
quality standards and production capacities. This is often not the case with Hungarian 
suppliers. The technological backwardness of domestic suppliers is usually too large” 
(expert group: foreign investment companies). 
                                                 
6 The region of Central Hungary comprises the city of Budapest and the surrounding district „Pest“. This 
region accounts for 60% of all FIE and 66% of the total FDI within Hungary (CSO, 2000, 68). 170 




Customer-contacts play an insignificant role because foreign investors in Hungary do 
mainly produce for export or for other foreign investment enterprises within Hungary. 
FIE account for 86% of Hungarian exports in manufacturing industry in 1998 (Hunya, 
2000, 13). “The Hungarian market is too small for foreign investment companies. They 
rely on export, especially to the EU. Customer-support in order to gain customers in 
Hungary or in order to compete with other firms is of no importance” (expert group: 
business associations). No survey material could be found on customer contacts as a 
spillover-mechanism – probably another indication for its insignificance in transition 
economies. 
Last but not least, networking as another potential spillover-mechanism has been 
investigated focusing on relevant business associations established in Hungary and joint 
R&D-activities. It was found that business associations are either dominated by foreign 
investment companies (e.g. foreign chambers of commerce and industry, Joint-Venture-
Association) or do not engage in activities that are suitable to increase cooperative links 
between foreign owned and domestic companies (e.g. Hungarian Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry, industry associations). Joint R&D-projects of foreign and 
domestic companies do hardly exist in Hungary because of the technological 
backwardness of domestic firms and the embeddedness of foreign subsidiaries in the 
global R&D strategy of the multinational concern. 
 
5 Conclusions 
It can be concluded that on the one hand FIE clearly contribute to the overall 
modernization process of Hungarian industry by establishing modern production plants 
including investments in R&D. However, on the other hand at this time they still build 
“modern islands” cooperating mainly among themselves – if at all. The empirical study 
shows that FIE and domestic companies have no significant contact and build virtually 
separate spheres within Hungarian industry. Not much different effects are expected for 




attracted FDI in similar quantity and quality (e.g. Poland, Czech Republic, Slovenia, 
Estonia). 
Multinational companies are of course no developmental agencies for economies in the 
process of catching-up. However, CEEC have to take into account that an increasing gap 
between modern equipped foreign owned companies and technological backward 
domestic firms leads to the already visible dual structure of the economy. If that process 
goes further, innovation-stimulating spillovers between the two sides become more and 
more difficult. From the author’s perspective, a first step against the increasing duality 
of industry should be a much stronger support for small and medium sized enterprises so 
that they can become equal partners to all Hungarian based companies. Furthermore, the 
capability to carry out innovation activities – a prerequisite for competitiveness within 
the world market – requires a development strategy that in the long run supports the 


















Data source: Eurostat (see: Stapel, 2001, 3) 
*Service Sector = NACE: G-O, Industry = NACE: C-F, Agriculture = NACE: A-B 
 
 












Data source: Eurostat (see: Stapel, 2001, 3) 






Appendix 3: List of expert interviews 
  Number of interviews 
Expert group 1: Foreign investment enterprises 
AUDI Hungaria Motor Kft.  2 
General Electric Lighting Tungsram Rt.  1 
Henkel Magyarország Kft.  1 
TEMIC Telefunken microelectronic Hungary Kft.  1 
Reemtsma Debrecen Tobacco Factory Kft.  1 
Zeuna Stärker Magyarországi Kft.  1 
Expert group 2: Policy-makers 
Economic policy 
Hungarian Ministry of Economic Affairs, Department: supplier 
program 
2 
Hungarian Ministry of Economic Affairs, Department: regional 
development 
1 
Hungarian Foundation for Enterprise Development (MVA)  2 
Investment and Trade Development Agency (ITD)  1 
Technology policy 
Hungarian Ministry of Education and Technology, Department: R&D-
strategy 
1 
Hungarian Ministry of Education and Technology, Depatrment: 
Technology Foresight Program 
1 
Institute for International Technology (NETI), Department: 
International Technology-transfer 
1 
Expert group 3: Business associations 
Industry associations 
Association of Hungarian Automobile Industry (MGSZ)  1 
Association of Hungarian Automobile Supplier Industry (MAJOSZ)  1 
Association of the Hungarian Chemical Industry  1 





Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (MKIK)  1 
Budapest Chamber of Commerce and Industry (BKIK)  1 
Further interest associations 
German-Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (DUIHK)  1 
American Chamber of Commerce and Industry (AmCham)  1 
Austrian Chamber of Commerce  1 
Joint-Venture-Association (JVA)  2 
Hungarian Association of International Companies  (HAIC)  1 
Association of Hungarian Employers and Industrialists  (MGYOSZ)  1 
Expert group 4: Representatives of domestic companies 
Videoton Holding Rt.  2 
Videoton Precíziós Kft.  1 
Hungarian Foundation for Enterprise Development (MVA), 
Department: Domestic supplier industry 
1 
Budapest Agency for Enterprise Support   2 
Expert group 5: Science 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute for World Economics  1 
Economic Research Institute of the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry (MKIK-GVI) 
1 
GKI Economic Research Co.  1 
Kopint Datorg - Economic Research Institute  1 
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